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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

F. H. CARLTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
Case No.

-vs.-

8413

MARION D. CARLTON,

Defendant and Respondent.

)

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is taken from an Order (R. 43-44) of
the trial court modifying a decree of divorce.
The action arose by the issuance of an Order to
Show Cause (R. 13) on behalf of the Respondent,
.:\[arion D. Carlton, and against the Appellant, F. H.
1
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Carlton, who were the defendant and plaintiff respectively in a divorce action, the Decree (R. 8-9) of which
vi· as entered the 24th day of June, 1954, by the Third
,Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. The default of the defendant was based
upon her Waiver and Entry of Appearance (R. 4)
therein.
By the terms of the Decree of Divorce (R. 8), Appellant was to pay Respondent $150.00 per month, representing $30.00 support money for each of four children
and $30.00 alimony. During the period of approximately
thirteen months between the date of divorce and the date
of hearing of the Order to Show Cause, the Appellant
had paid the support and alimony designated under the
Decree regularly and had in addition made other payn1ents on behalf of the Respondent, including payments
on the mortgage of the home occupied by Respondent.
The Respondent filed her Petition for ~Modification
of Decree (R. 10-11-12) on the 22nd day of July, 1955,
in which she alleged: (1) that since the divorce she had
discovered that the equity in the home of the parties at
2737 Morningside Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah, was
not more than $500.00, rather than $5,000.00 as alleged
in the complaint; (2) that Appellant in addition to paying the support and alimony as required by the Decree
had paid the house payments, and that with Appellant
paying thus Respondent was still unable to support herself and the minor children without working outside thr
home; (3) that Appellant had now refused to continue
to make said house payments and that it would be im-
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possible for her to support herself and the minor children
and make the house payments; ( 4) that Respondent dis<·on'rrd since thP divorce Decree was entered that _Appellant is earning and capable of earning in excess of
$7,500.00 per year, and that Appellant had concealed
from Respondent substantial sums of money which Appellant had saved and deposited in local banks and
savings associations, and that it would be for the best
interest of the children for Respondent to cease her
employment and remain at home with her minor children. Respondent from the foregoing prayed the court
to modify the original Decree of divorce to require
Appellant to pa~' $70.00 per month for each child and
$100.00 per month to Respondent as alimony.
Based upon the Petition of the Respondent, thP
court issued an Order to Show Cause (R. 13) which '"a~
duly served upon the Appellant (R. 14).
Appellant thereupon filed his Motion to Dismiss
Order to Show Cause (R. 17) supported by his Affidavit
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause
(R. 15-16). Appellant's :\fotion to Dismiss Order to
Show Cause (R. 17) contended that the Affidavit or
Petition for Modification (R. 10-11-12) filed hy the
Respondent to support the Order to Show Cause did
not allege a change of circumstance or condition occurring since the date of the divorce.
Appellant'~ ~fotion

to DismisR Order to ~how< Hll~P
(R. 17) was argued before the conrt on August 1, 1955,
and the court dismissed the ~lotion and in so doing
stated, ''There isn't an allegation of specific fraud, but

1
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I think in substance there is a showing from which fraud
might he inferred" {R. 19).
r.rhereafter the Order to Show Cause was heard and
the court thereafter entered its Order (R. 43-44), from
which Order this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S :MOTION TO DISMISS ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE SINCE RESPONDENT'S PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE DOES NOT
STATE OR ALLEGE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE GRANTING OF
rrHFJ DIVORCE DECREE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
:MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
SINCE THE EVIDENCE TAKEN AT THE HEARING OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DID NOT
ESTABLISH A MA1,ERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR
PER1\1ANENT CHANGE OF CIRCUl\1:STANCES
SINCE THE DATE OF THE DECREE.

POINT III
rrHE rrRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH
IT BASED ITS ORDER 1\1:0DIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
~lAJ{E
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S l\IOTION TO DISMISS ORDER TO
RHOW CAUSE SINCE RESPONDENT'S PETITION
FOR I\IODIFICATION OF DECREE DOES NOT
STATE OR ALLEGE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OF CIRCUl\fSTANCES SINCE THE GRANTING OF
THE DIVORCE DECREE.
The Petition for l\fodification of Decree (R. 10-1112) filed in the court below by Respondent did not allege
any facts showing a material, substantial or permanent
change of conditions from those which existed at the
time of the entry of the original Decree.
Respondent's Petition does not in any particular
point out any change of circumstances of the parties
from the date of the divorce Decree to the date of the
Order to Show Cause. The closest the Respondent
comes to such is an allegation ''That Defendant has
discovered since the divorce Decree was entered on the
24th day of June, 1954, that Plaintiff is earning and
capable of earning in excess of $7,500.00 per year" (R.
11), with no mention whatsoever as to what Appellant
was making at the time the decree was entered. The
reasonableness of the rule requiring specific allegations
of a change of condition is readily apparent in this in~tance. Respondent had signed a joint income tax return
with the Appellant within· approximately thirty days
of the divorce Decree (R. 28) and thus knew full well
what Appellant was making at the time of the Decree,
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and that it was more than the income which she alleged
in her Petition. If Respondent had clearly stated the
facts relative to income both as to the time of divorce
and the time of the requested Order to Show Cause, she
would have been unable to secure the Order to Show
Cause from the court, at least on that ground.
It has long been the law in this state that a petition

for modification of alimony or support awarded in a
divorce decree must state facts sufficient to authorize
its modification, as indicated in Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 63
U. 261, 225 P. 76.

In Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952 at page 954
in the Pacific Reporter, in regard to the interpretation
of the statute whereby the court derives its power to
modify a divorce decree, the court uses the following
language:
''Although the language is general in permitting 'subsequent changes and new orders' to be
made, yet we think it was not thereby intended
that the courts could at any time review their own
former orders or decrees respecting the allowance
of alimony, etc. and are of the opinion that what
was contemplated by the statute was that where
a court had granted a decree of diYorce, and had
allowed alimony, or had made distribution of
property and disposal of children either party
could thereafter come into court and allege that
since the entry of the original decree material
and permanent changes had taken place."

6
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
SINCE THE EVIDENCE TAI\:EN AT THE HEARI~G OF rrHE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DID NOT
EST . .\BLISH A l\IATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR
PER~IANENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
SINCE THE DATE OF THE DECREE.
~IODIFICATION

Assuming for the purposes of this argument that
Respondent had properly pleaded and alleged a change
of circumstances, the record of the evidence taken at
the hearing on the Order to Show Cause entirely fails
to prove a change of conditions or circumstances authorizing a modification of the decree of divorce.
Although there were no pleadings to apprise the
Appellant that he would have to meet a claim of increased
income since the date of the divorce, the Respondent
testified (R. 24) on direct examination:
'' Q. Mrs. Carlton, since your divorce have
you had occasion to examine Mr. Carlton's Income tax returns for the year 1954~

A. Yes, I saw them.
Q. How much income did Mr. Carlton report
for the year 1954 ~

A. Around $7,800.00.
Q. $7 ,800.00.

A. Yes.
Q. Do you know, Mrs. Carlton, how much he
reported on for 1953 ~

7
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A. It was between $6,500 and $7 ,000.00."
And again. on redirect examination (R. 31), the
Respondent testified :
'' Q. Do you recall how much the 1953 income
tax showed he was making'

A. No I don't.
Q. Can you give us anything in regard to
what it was'
A. Between six and seven thousand dollars.''

The Appellant testified concerning his income (R.
33) on direct examination as follows:

"Q. Mr. Carlton there has been some testimony here relative to the fact between 1953 and
1954 you made more money, $800.00 more, or
more than $800.00, will you please testify to the
court as to your income in 1953, '54 and '55~
A. In 1954 I made approximately $1,200.00
less than I did in 1953, which return :Mrs. Carlton
signed.
Q. $1,200.00 less?

A. That is right.
Q. And this year, what is it, just roughly can
you estimate whether it is going to be more or
less?

A. It would be either the same or less than
the 1954 - less than it was in 1954.''
Respondent above admits that she did not recall
how much the 1953 income tax of Appellant showed, and
then guessed that it was between six and seven thousand
dollars.
8
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Now here else in the record do we find any attempt
h~· the Respondent to prove a change of condition other
than that the needs of the children were increasingly
expensive, with no evidence as to particulars.
'rhere is no question but that the law of this state
is that a person who seeks to modify a decree of divorce
must prove changed conditions arising since the entry
of the decree.
In the case of Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47
P. 2d 419, at page 420 of the Pacific Reporter, the Court
says:
"It is well settled in this court that in order
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the
moving party must allege and prove changed
conditions arising since the entry of the decree
which require, under rules of equity and justice,
a change in the decree. ''
In the case of Jones L'. Jones, 104 U. 275, 139 P. 2d
222, at page 224 in the Pacific Reporter, the Court quoteH
with approval the above statement from the Hampton
case and states :
"There can be no doubt but what it 1s the
settled law of this state."
As stated in Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 U. 196,
111 P. 2d 792, the Court stated, on page 793 of the Pacific
Reporter:
''In order for appellant to be entitled to modification of the divorce decree as to alimony, she
must allege and prove some change in circumstances on the part of either herself or the party
9
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required to pay the alimony, justifying the court
in modifying its decree.''
Also in the Barraclough case the Court quoted with
approval the case of Langroll v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340,
125 A. 695, as follows:
''The amount of the alimony having been fixed
by a formal decree of the court, in accordance
with a definite agreement of the parties, a change
in that determination should not be made except
for clearly sufficient reasons. Our inquiry is not
directed to a review of the original award, but is
solely concerned with any difference between the
present circumstances of the parties and those
whirh existed when the decree for alimony was
passed.''
The evidence given by the Respondent leaves no
doubt that she was attempting to attack the reasonableness of the original decree. It is the contention of the
Appellant that the original decree of divorce is res
judicata as to previous conditions authorizing alimony
and support. The matter before the court is not whether
the decree was right when entered because all presumptions are in its favor, but the question is, has the necessity of the Respondent changed since the entry of the
Decree, andjor has the ability of the Appellant to contribute increased. \Ye submit that the Respondent failed
entirely to meet this test in her evidence.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
MAI<E ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH

10
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IT BASED ITS ORD_B~R MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
The record is entirely devoid of findings of fact
from the evidence adduced from which the Court could
justifiahly enter the Order Modifying the Decree of
Divorce. It cannot be seriously contended that the following language by the Court in its Order (R. 43) constitutes a finding:
"Hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE
as follows : 1. That there has been a change of
circumstances of the parties since the 24th day
of June, 1954, and that the court should modify
the decree of court entered on the 24th day of
June, 1954. ''
Certainly the most that can be said for this statement
is that it is a conclusion, and nowhere do we find any
finding of fact upon which the court can base this conclusion. Of this the Supreme Court has said in Parish
v. Parish, 84 U. 390, 35 P. 2d 999, at page 1,000 in the
Pacific Reporter :
,., A mere conclusion that the decree should or
should not be modified, or that the eYidence is
sufficient or insufficient to authorize relief, will
not satisfy the requirements of the statute that
the facts found must conform to the issues and be
separately stated.''
In the case of Piper v. Eakle, 78 U. 342, 2 P. 2d 909,
at page 910 in the Pacific Reporter the Court RayR:
"It is the duty of the court to find upon all
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the
faiiure to do so is reversible error as has been
· repeatedly held by this court.''

11
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The failure of the court to make findings makes the
position of the Appellant extremely difficult on appeal
since he is left to 'guess' what issues or evidence he
should stress in his brief. For the Appellant to have
covered all of the pleadings and evidence would have
violated the requirement of brevity and so the Appellant
has chosen only those points that seem to warrant discussion.

CONCLUSION
It appears that what the lower court attempted to
do in this case was to rewrite the original Decree more
in conformity with what the court thought that the
original Decree should have provided. Had the matter
of the reasonableness of the original Decree been the
issue before the Court, Appellant could and would have
presented facts as to why the Appellant sought the
Decree as it was written and why Respondent agreed to
it in signing a Waiver and Entry of Appearance. However, the lower court did not have that prerogrative
but as stated by the Supreme Court in Gale v. Gale, 258
P. 2d 986:

''The legal principle controlling in this case
is that a divorce decree may not be modified
unless it is alleged, proved and the trial court
finds that the circumstances upon which it was
based have undergone a substantial change.''
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant
failed to allege, failed to prove and the trial court failed
to find the change of circumstances necessary to sub-
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stantiate a Modification of the Divorce Decree, and,
therefore, the trial court's Order should be annulled
and the Decree as originally entered should be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

KING, ANDERSON & BROWN
Attorneys for Appellant

IW
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